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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, : 
Petitioner and : 
Appellant, 
vs. : 
THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, and THE STATE OF : 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND 
PAROLE, : 
: Appellate Court No. 
Respondent and 20020912-CA 
Appellee, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous asides that attempt 
to obfuscate the central issues on appeal. This Court should not 
be sidetracked by any of Appellee's superfluous arguments. The 
merits of this case cry out to be heard, and this Court 
should properly focus its attention upon them. 
One aside mentioned first in Appellee's Brief (at 3) rather 
than at the lower court and thus is not part of any record, is 
"...after scientific advances in DNA technology permitted...". This 
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is nowhere in any record, and was never even discussed or argued 
at any stage of any proceeding. The implication is that DNA 
technology was somehow involved in Mr. Linden's charge. It was 
not, and its incorporation within the Statement of Facts by 
Appellee is exactly the type of superfluity that could have a 
negative impact but is totally without substance. This statement 
needs to be excised from consideration. The summary of the balance 
of Appellant's arguments in this reply brief are as follows. 
The Appellee's urging to find Utah Administrative Code Rule 
671-518-1 as mandatory is not in conformity with statute, other 
administrative rules, nor cas€> law. The word "may" should be 
understood in its common usage, and cannot be construed as 
"mandatory" . This is further contrasted by the use of the word 
"shall" in subsequent administrative rules, which relate to the 
same general issues of parole revocation. 
In the final analysis, the option of R671-518-1 was never 
reached by the Parole Board. Instead, they elected to hold a 
parole board hearing and subjected themselves to the fairness 
requirements of due process. R671-518-1 is a non-issue. 
Another argument raised by Appellee, with equally less than 
candescent illumination, is that Mr. Linden was somehow tasked with 
the responsibility of revealing to the Board at the hearing, all of 
his past ignominies and misdeeds. In other words, that he was 
required, at the hearing, to inform the Board of his involvement in 
a crime that occurred, at that time, 13 years previously. This was 
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to be offered by the inmate irrespective even though it wasn't in 
the parole agreement. Since it was not in the parole agreement as 
a requirement (and until there is an amendment taking the Fifth 
Amendment out of the U.S. Constitution), Mr. Linden should not be 
held to a requirement of which he had no knowledge. 
This issue, again, is a non-issue as this is NOT the reason 
Mr. Linden's parole was violated. He was violated for violating 
Condition Three of his parole agreement. 
The last issue raised by Appellee is that Utah should 
recognize and adopt the holding in the Patuxent case cited by both 
the Appellee and Appellant. The Appellee argues that this case 
allows parole to be revoked for violation of a condition of parole 
during the term of parole; for commission of a crime, whether or 
not the parole term has started; or for misconduct occurring either 
before, or after, the grant of parole. Patuxent Institution Board 
of Review v. Clarence J. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917, 930 (Maryland App. 
1993) . 
This would mean that since Mr. Linden had committed a crime 
predating the granting of parole (in this case 1986), that under 
the law of this case he could have his parole violated. 
Unfortunately, this is actually the "smoking gun" case that favors 
the Appellant. The Appellee neglected to include the very next 
sentence, which states "When violation of a condition of parole is 
alleged, the parolee must be aware that the conduct constituting 
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the violation is prohibited by a condition of parole". There is no 
condition of parole that states that parole can be violated for a 
crime that predates the parole. It would have been a simple matter 
to include that as a special condition. It certainly is not listed 
in Condition Three of Mr. Linden's parole agreement. Under the law 
in this case, Mr. Linden should not have had his parole revoked. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the 
trial court and Mr. Linden should be immediately released. 
ARGUMENT 
The argument raised by Appellee regarding the application of 
Qt. Admin. Code R671-518-1 was addressed in Appellant's Brief and 
will not be further examined in this Reply Brief except in a 
limited fashion. Appellee argues throughout his brief that, 
although the Board of Pardons "was not required to do so" by virtue 
of this rule, they held a parole revocation hearing nevertheless. 
The implication is that R671-518-1 mandates a virtually automatic 
parole revocation. This is not the case. R671-518-1 provides 
If a parolee has been charged with a new criminal 
offense, which is also the basis for revocation, and the parolee is 
convicted of a criminal charge, the Board may revoke parole upon 
receipt of verification of conviction. The Board need not hold a 
parole revocation or evidentiary hearing even if the parolee 
continues to deny guilt. It is sufficient that a trial court has 
adjudicated guilt. However, the Board may schedule a special 
appearance hearing or parole rehearing if it wishes to ask 
questions of the parolee or a victim asks to give testimony. The 
Board may revoke parole and reincarcerate even if the criminal 
trial court or appellate court has granted a Certificate of 
Probably Cause in the criminal matter. After a conviction of guilt 
and revocation of parole, the Board may then place the parolee on 
a hearing calendar. (Addendum 5, Brief of Appellee). 
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This rule allows for a revocation of parole upon the 
requirements set forth above. However, the critical element here 
is that this was not the election of the Board. Under rules of 
statutory construction, the use of the word "may" allows a choice. 
(Cite). The use of "may" is replete within R671-518-1. In fact, 
it begins in the first sentence ("...the Board may revoke 
parole. . .") and continues "... the Board may schedule a...", "... the 
Board may revoke parole and reincarcerate...", and "...the Board 
may then...". May allows may not. The Board of Pardons evidently 
made their election to allow Mr. Linden the opportunity of 
presenting a defense to their allegation that he violated Parole 
Agreement Condition Number Three (Brief of Appellant, pgs. 5-9, 12-
21) . 
Although R671-518-1 provides the "may" option, Utah Code Ann 
f 77-27-11 (cited by Appellant at 3 and 12 of Appellant's Brief and 
its Addendum A, and Appellee's Brief at 2,5 and 9 and its Addendum 
2) it is clear that its requirements are not optional. Although 
paragraph 1 of this section utilizes "may" in that the board "may" 
revoke the parole of any person found to have violated a condition 
of parole, 1, paragraph (5)(a) does not. It states, "The board or 
1
 Utah Code Ann. Section 77-25-11 states: 
77-27-11. Revocation of Parole. 
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person who 
is found to have violated any condition of his parole. 
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its appointed examiner shall conduct a hearing on the alleged 
violation, and the parolee shall have written notice of the time 
and place of the hearing, the alleged violation of parole, and a 
statement of the evidence against him". "Shall" is not "may", and 
in accordance universally accepted rules of statutory construction 
"shall" means there is not an election, but is a predicate to the 
command "it will occur". It would appear then that the board may 
indeed violate an inmate's parole, but if it intends to, then it 
must follow certain requirements, among which are written notice of 
the hearing, the alleged violation, and so forth. 
Even if the Court did not conclude that the statutory language 
in U.C.A. I 77-27-11 of "shall" didn't trump "may", it should 
nevertheless reach the "non-mandatory" conclusion (i.e., that 
R671-518-1 is not mandatory) by referencing Utah Administrative 
Code Rule 671-521. Rule 671-521-1 allows alternatives other than 
further imprisonment for parole violators. It also incorporates 
the word "may" and is as follows: 
R671-521-1. Alternatives to Re-Incarceration of 
Parolees. 
The Board may pursue alternatives other than further 
imprisonment for parole violators. A parole violation shall not 
preclude an offender from being considered for continuance on 
parole or re-parole. 2 (Addendum 1). 
2
 Craig Bennett, Linden's parole agent, stated in the 
Warrant Request & Parole Violation Report, "It is the 
recommendation of Region III staff that Linden be given credit 
for his time served in Idaho and granted a Utah parole date as 
early as feasible." (Brief of Appellant, Addendum D, page 3). 
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The administrative rules themselves, upon which Petitioner has 
hung his figurative hat, when examined en toto, also do not lend 
support to Petitioner's position. 
The statute and administrative rules do not stand alone. The 
parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he 
can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that 
circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not 
warrant revocation. Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), 
1972.SCT.42540<http://www.versuslaw.com>, at 9, para. 44. 
Moreover, the propriety of extending due process to Board 
proceedings has been established by the Utah Supreme Court which 
declared: "Due process pursuant to article 1, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, requires that the inmate know what information the 
Board will be considering at the hearing and that the inmate know 
soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies". Peterson v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, 931 P.2d 147 (Ut. Court of Appeal, 1997), 
1997.UT.15942<http://www.versuslaw.com> at 14, para. 71 (citing 
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909). 
Lastly, R671-518-1 is a non-issue if only because there is not 
evidence before this Court that the Parole Board considered 
applying R671-518-1. It wasn't applied; instead, there was a 
parole board hearing. Because there was a parole board hearing, 
Utah Code Ann. f 77-27-11 applies. 
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In conclusion, raising the spectre of R671-518-1 and its 
alleged omnipotence is, as has been illustrated, at best a strawman 
argument easily dismantled by the scarecrows of logic. It attempts 
to obscure through misdirection the real issue, to wit: is it 
violative of fundamental due process for the parole board to set 
conditions of parole, to which the inmate agrees, and then apply 
the conditions retroactively? That this issue is not addressed 
speaks volumes. 
The next argument by Appellee relates to the issue that 
Appellant's withholding or concealing of his knowledge about the 
Idaho murder also constituted a violation of the terms and 
conditions of his Utah parole. (Brief of Appellee at 11)• 
The most serious problem with that argument is that this is 
not why Mr. Linden's parole was violated. There is simply no 
evidence in the documents before this Court that his withholding or 
concealing of his knowledge about the Idaho murder constituted a 
violation of the conditions of his parole agreement. If so, which 
one? Addendum B of the Brief of Appellant is a copy of the parole 
agreement. There is nothing within the four corners of that 
agreement, signed and agreed to by both Mr. Linden and authorized 
by the Board of Pardons by their representative's signature, that 
requires Mr. Linden to tell the parole board about any prior 
misdeeds. 
Applying the logic of Appellee's argument to the case at bar, 
Mr. Linden would be required, then, as mentioned in Appellant's 
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Brief at 19, to bare his breast and confess to every crime he had 
ever committed, just to be on the safe side. All misdemeanors, 
felonies, infractions, including speeding, jay walking, income tax 
fudging, etc. must be disgorged, covering the lifetime of the 
parolee. This not only is not practical, it was not required by 
the Parole Board by the Parole Agreement. It is not even required 
in the Special Conditions, which are the non-stock requirements. 
An inmate should not have to contend with a legal game of hide 
the banana. If Mr. Linden was required to tell the parole board of 
any other crimes with which he had some involvement as a condition 
of parole (and aren't there serious Fifth Amendment issues?), then 
the Parole Board had a duty to spell it out in the Parole 
Agreement. It was not. This argument is specious and non-
meritorious. 
Finally, as to this issue, Appellee cites State v. Barnes, 826 
P.2d 1346 (Idaho App. 1992) in support of the notion Mr. Linden was 
required to tell the parole board about his 1986 Idaho crime, and 
therefore his failure to so do constituted a violation of his Utah 
parole. This case is inapposite. Although the facts are somewhat 
similar to Lindens, the similarity is superficial. This case has 
absolutely nothing to do with parole revocation. There was no 
finding that the party charged violated his parole by withholding 
information of a prior offense. Eugene (therein probably lies the 
reason for his lifelong criminal behavior) Barnes pled guilty to 
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being an accessory to a murder and was sentenced to two years. He 
appealed this sentence because he felt the sentence was excessive. 
He was not on parole and there were no revocation of parole issues. 
Barnes simply does not apply. 
The final issue raised in appellee's brief faults appellant 
for failing to acknowledge a particular holding in the Patuxent 
case cited by both appellant and appellee. Brief of appellee at 13. 
Appellee states, "the Maryland Court of Appeals held that parole 
may be revoked for violation of a condition of parole during the 
term of parole; for commission of a crime, whether or not the 
parole term has started; or for misconduct occurring either before, 
or after, the grant of parole". Ibid. This statement is taken out 
of context and its meaning is thus altered. The next sentence was 
not included, and continues "When violation of a condition of 
parole is alleged, the parolee must be aware that the conduct 
constituting the violation is prohibited by a condition of 
parole".(Emphasis mine). Patuxent Institution Board of Review v. 
Clarence J. Hancock. 620 A.2d 917, 930 (Maryland App. 1993), 
1993.MD.40309,<http://www.versuslaw.com>,at 14, para. 80. Since 
virtually the entire case is a treatise on the issue on the 
prospective application of a condition of parole and appropriate 
notice to the parolee of the condition, a meaning not intended by 
the holding of the case is particularly obvious. As in the 
Maryland case, Utah must insure that the parolee is aware that the 
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conduct constituting a violation of parole is prohibited by a 
condition of parole. In other words, the parolee, to have his 
parole violated, must violate a condition of parole. It must not 
be a superfluity, or an ambiguity, or an amorphous prior conduct. 
It must be straightforward and spelled out in the parole 
agreement. 
Patuxent is the appellant's smoking gun. It should be adopted 
in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellant asks this Court to reverse 
the decision of the District Court granting a dismissal of the 
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. James Harleston Linden should 
be given his immediate release. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORRISON & MORRISON, LLC 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Petitioner/ 
Appellant 
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